Terrific pandemic flu post from Revere (updated)

at Effect Measure. Whether avian influenza is being ignored by the media, or there’s a human cluster and hacks suddenly predict the sky falling on our heads, EM is a place to go for sober professional analysis (his atheosplenetic Freethinker Sunday Sermonettes are worth a visit, too). Here is a case in point: Pandemic influenza subtypes: end of year round up.

It contains some good science about flu viruses, pandemics and their -ology. You don’t need a degree, it is lucid informative writing that doesn’t scare and does inform. And at the end it puts in a plea for good public health provision and a strengthening of society’s structures:

Because perseveration is a characteristic and privilege of the aged, we will repeat again in this last bird flu post of 2007 what we have been saying here since late 2004. The best way to prepare for an influenza pandemic is to do those things which make for a robust community, especially building and strengthening the public health and social service infrastructure. This is like repairing the roof on your dwelling. It will help protect against heat, cold, rain, sleet or snow. It won’t keep you safe from an asteroid or a nuclear attack. A strong public health system also won’t protect you from a pandemic with a 30% attack rate and 60% CFR. But it will help with a hell of a lot of other things, including many of the most plausible candidate influenza pandemic viruses.

Update: another flublog of note  H5N1 (does what it says on the tin) has a Thoughts on 2008 roundup piece which is also really worth a read.  A couple of points: H5N1 does not have to infect humans to have a major impact:

When scores of millions of people make their livings from poultry, H5N1 becomes a political issue. When hundreds of millions depend on poultry for much of their protein, H5N1 becomes a major political issue.

He also paints a possible and desirable world picture:

With all my heart, I hope 2008 will see a further drop in the number of cases. Sixty would be good. Forty would be better. Maybe H5N1, in its patient efforts to mutate into something deadlier, could mutate itself into total failure, make itself a viral has-been.

And makes a plea for Homo to be just that bit more sapiens in case H5N1 does not become a viral has-been.

But at this point it still has the power to frighten not just us, but our governments. If it frightens them enough, they might stop buying so goddam many fighter planes and ICBMs and stealth bombers, and start spending on public-health measures for the people the weapons are supposed to protect.

A robustly healthy population will survive the worst pandemic in better shape than the best-prepared individual household, with its basement full of canned soup and toilet paper. If flu bloggers can help to prod governments into realizing this, before the pandemic hits, then we will have done a service worth doing.

And so say all of us.

One Response to “Terrific pandemic flu post from Revere (updated)”

  1. wilfriedsoddemann Says:

    Transmission of avian flu by drinking water

    Transmission of avian flu by direct contact to infected poultry is an unproved assumption from the WHO. Infected poultry can everywhere contaminate the drinking water. All humans have contact to drinking water. Special in cases of decentral water supplies this pathway can explain small cluster in households. In hot climates/tropics the flood-related influenza is typical after extreme weather and natural after floods. Virulence of Influenza virus depends on temperature and time. If young and fresh H5N1 contaminated water from low local wells, cisterns, tanks, rain barrels or rice fields is used for water supply water temperature for infection may be higher (24°C: virulence of influenza viruses 2 days) as in temperate climates with older water from central water supplies (7°C: virulence of influenza viruses 14 days).
    Human to human and contact transmission of influenza occur - but are overvalued immense. In the course of Influenza epidemics in Germany recognized cluster are rarely (9% of the cases in the season 2005).
    In temperate climates the lethal H5N1 avian flu virus will be transferred to humans strong seasonal in the cold via cold drinking water, as with the birds feb/mar 2006.
    Recent research must worry: So far the virus had to reach the bronchi and the lungs in order to infect humans. Now it infects the upper respiratory system (mucous membranes of the throat e.g. when drinking and mucous membranes of the nose and probably also the conjunctiva of the eyes as well as the eardrum e.g. at showering). In a few cases (Viet Nam, Thailand) stomach and intestine by the H5N1 virus were stricken but not the bronchi and the lungs. The virus might been orally taken up, e.g. when drinking contaminated water.
    The performance to eliminate viruses of the drinking water processing plants regularly does not meet the requirements of the WHO and the USA/USEPA. Conventional disinfection procedures are poor, because microorganisms in the water are not in suspension, but embedded in particles. Even ground water used for drinking water is not free from viruses.
    In temperate climates the strong seasonal waterborne infections like norovirus, rotavirus, salmonellae, campylobacter and - differing from the usual dogma - influenza are mainly triggered by drinking water dependent on the drinking water temperature (in Germany minimum feb/mar – maximum august). There is no evidence that influenza primary is transmitted by saliva droplets. In temperate climates the strong interdependence between influenza infections and environmental temperatures can’t be explained with the primary biotic transmission by saliva droplets from human to human with temperatures of 37.5°C. There must be an abiotic vehicle like cold drinking water. There is no other appropriate abiotic vehicle. In Germany about 98% of inhabitants have a central public water supply with older and better protected water. Therefore in temperate climates like in Germany cold water is decisive to virulence of viruses.

    Dipl.-Ing. Wilfried Soddemann
    eMail soddemann-aachen@t-online.de
    http://www.dugi-ev.de/information.html
    Epidemiological Analysis:
    http://www.dugi-ev.de/TW_INFEKTIONEN_H5N1_20071019.pdf

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